by Karel B. Müller, University of Economics, Prague

Objectives

This essay addresses the issue of the EU’s democratic deficit from the perspective of the complementary theory of civil society. A European civil society is predominantly conceptualised, according to my opinion overtly simplistically, as NGOs operating in a trans-national European context. The disadvantages of this reductionist conceptualisation are plentiful, because of the lack of sociological dynamism. I would like to offer an alternative perspective and provide a critical interpretative framework for analysing civil society on a European level; the theoretical and analytical framework of a different European civil society. I will start with presenting a robust normative perspective on the concept of civil society. On the silhouette of the outlined theoretical background I will draw major institutional and socio-cultural preconditions and forms of an emerging civil society in the European transnational context. I believe that this view is capable of grasping the issue in its complexity and explaining structural aspects of the problem, whilst taking into account the behaviour of specific social actors in its broader contextual framework (Müller 2006). The complementary theory of civil society could be applied as an analytic tool not only to conceptualise the notion of a European civil society but to grasp the problem of democratic deficit in its complexity and socio-institutional reflexivity. Therefore, this proposition suggests that the EU’s democratic deficit rests in a deficit of a European civil society, therefore the analysis and the concept of a European civil society provides a key tool to understanding and overcoming the democratic deficit of the EU.  Finally I will outline some of the conceptual parameters of an emerging European public sphere and European identity as the two major components of European civil society.

Background of the Problem

The weakness of European civil society and the EU’s democratic deficit are undoubtedly interlocked issues, since civil society (according to the mainstream political theory) is thought of and perceived as the main source of legitimate governance in a liberal democracy. This view suggests that in order to reduce the democratic deficit of the EU there is a need to build a civil society which would be embedded and viable within this political framework; i.e. a trans-national civil society. There isn’t actually any solid consensus among social scientists what the democratic deficit of the EU actually consists of. At first glance it is already obvious that an approach to the EU’s democratic deficit depends on an approach to the theory of democracy and the concept of democratic legitimacy (Eriksen, Fossum 2004). I personally disagree with the position that the democratic deficit is merely ‘information deficit’ rather then a deficit of democratic legitimacy (although the ‘information deficit’ is undoubtedly part of the intricate problem with the democratic deficit). In relation to the obstacles of the EU’s constitutional process, there is clear evidence of a growing awareness among both politicians and the public across Europe that political integration has advanced without taking into account the grassroots socio-cultural and symbolic ingredients and preconditions. There have been complaints about the lack of Europeanness or European identity, i.e. European solidarity, and a sense of belonging; the lack of a European demos; an underdeveloped European public sphere, and the lack of institutional transparency, legitimacy, and technocratic decision making processes.

I deduce that the quest for a stronger European civil society is a highly important question, particularly in the light of the current transformation (crisis) of the nation state, and the necessity to form trans-national political institutions which will increase political readiness to tackle the risks of a globalising modernity (Giddens 2007). This is particularly relevant regarding the EU’s decision-making capacities and its need to apply the decision-making mechanism of a ‘majority vote’. The lack of a European collective self-understanding and an underdeveloped European public sphere makes the application of the ‘majority vote’ mechanism very limited, and therefore the political capacities of the EU (and consequently its citizens) to form a common political will are very constrained.
In other words, fostering a European civil society (i.e. political identity and a European public sphere, among others) is a matter of sustaining democratic governance in Europe. Firstly, here I accept the communitarian argument that democratic decision-making processes can only take place when individuals of a given polity consider themselves as members of one society; i.e. if they share bonds of common identity (Taylor 1990). Self-restraint is exercised in exchange for the recognition of the common interests of the whole (society), which one is a part of and therefore its interests are also one’s own interests. Only under such conditions is the political system resistant to a fatal tendency towards fragmentation. A common identity guarantees loyalty of those whose interests were not reflected in the political system’s outputs. Secondly, I presume that a transparent and accountable governance can only be exercised and enforced if the representatives of political institutions are exposed to a legitimate and critical publicity, hence the need for a European public as the precondition of political transparency and accountability in the EU. There is no doubt that quests for a European public sphere and European identity are intrinsically (conceptually and empirically) connected issues.

The Complementary Account on Civil Society

The contemporary liberal interpretation of the concept of civil society is rooted in European Enlightenment, and this philosophical tradition can be traced at the very least back to Locke, but A. de Tocqueville may be regarded as the first modern theorist of civil society. Tocqueville’s Democracy in America reveals his extraordinary sociological imagination to pinpoint, whilst observing the emerging young American democracy, all the crucial aspects and risks to be found in this new social order. Reconstructing Tocqueville’s (1968) social theory we can find four functional dimensions between civil society and the state: defensive, legitimising, participative, and integrative. These four functional dimensions are cited with varying degrees of emphasis by all authors dealing with the issue of civil society.  Below, we will look at the individual dimensions in greater detail.

The main value of civil society lies in its extra-political nature and its independence from state power, and in its ability to maintain this independence. Civil society should above all be capable of acting as a defence against the potential expansionism of state power. It is part of the European historical experience that every power, often in the name of efficiency and the ability to mobilise itself, that there is a tendency to gravitate towards centralisation; this increases the risk of the abuse of power. This is where the defensive function of civil society comes into play.

The legitimising function of civil society is based on the fact that civil society through its independence and autonomy creates the social resources for political power and gives the state and its government legitimacy. The power of the state or of the government is only legitimate when it is able to enjoy the trust of its citizens. The extra-political status of civil society guarantees, among other things, that political power is executed ‘rationally’, as civil society establishes public opinion independently to that of political power. Nonetheless, for political power this public opinion has a binding and normative character. It is not possible in any democracy to rule for any real period of time if the government is in conflict with public opinion. But in order for it to be possible to form public opinion, civil society must constitute a relatively large structure within which social interests and priorities that condition and substantiate the democratic state and government policy are consistently articulate, agreed upon, and verified.

A third dimension is the participative function. Civil society ought to facilitate the more effective involvement of citizens in the public sphere than established political parties. If someone wants to block the construction of a gas station or promote the construction of a children’s playground, it is not necessary that they enter into politics to do so, nor is it necessary, at the opposite extreme, that they wait for the next election. Broadly based civic participation may consist of the massive mobilisation of resources that is facilitated by the widespread dissemination of information and knowledge, which helps ensure that the process of democratic political decision-making is of high quality. Instead of political centralisation, civil participation involves multi-levelled decentralisation, which provides citizens with an unobstructed link to public administration and, potentially, access to the process of political decision-making. It also leads to a more economical and more effective use of material resources. The nature of interest groups, and specifically their focus on a particular problem or issue, means that they are generally able to recognise or identify serious risks or dangers much sooner than political parties are, and they are also able to propose useful solutions. It is then up to the public and the politicians to assess this group action and how to react to it.

The last, but by no means the least important expectation associated with civil society is the fact that, within it, relationships of affinity and loyalty are formed, and this is civil society’s integrative function. Through our repeated involvement in the workings of civil society we eventually come to realise that in order for our voice to be heard and our interests to be taken into account we need to join forces with someone else. In an egalitarian and democratic society, if we want to be of influence and effect change we must work together with others. This in turn engenders a sense of belonging to or affinity with an interest group. More broadly there then emerges a sense of belonging to the society as a whole and identifying with the given political system. Civil society creates room for the reproduction of shared symbols, values, and norms. But it is not about everyone being able to achieve their own interests. It is necessary to consider the character of the political process, not just its outcome. The feeling that our requirements are being heard is important, and even if they are not being acted on at the moment, it is possible to try and assert them again any time in the future. Inspired by Giddens’ approach (1990) to an analysis of the nature of contemporary modern societies, I define the functional dimension in relation to civil society and the democratic state as depicted below in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Four functional dimensions in relation between civil society and the state

In this figure the outer circle represents the whole of civil society, and the small circle around the centre represents the state and the sphere of political power, i.e. the sphere of the control of information and social supervision. The above mentioned functions or expectations associated with the concept of civil society can be plotted in the figure as follows: at the top end of the vertical axis is the protective or defensive function, which is an analogy of the concept of ‘negative freedom’ (Giddens (1990) calls it emancipatory politics). This function relates primarily to the provision of legal guarantees, securing the space of civic autonomy, and the liberation from inequality. At the opposite end of the vertical axis is the participative function, which, conversely, corresponds to the concept of ‘positive freedom’ (corresponding to Giddens’ ‘life politics’). This dimension concentrates on the overall quality of the social environment, which features the opportunities for political self-realisation and a fulfilled and satisfied civic life. Both values form the content of the shifting dynamics in the relationship between civil society and the state.

The legitimising function of civil society is at the right end of the horizontal axis, the entire right half of which indicates the mutual dependency and interconnectedness of civil society and the democratic state. Civil society creates the social resources of political power and establishes the credibility, or legitimacy, of the democratic state, which in turn is responsible for protecting civil society and establishing the relationships of trust in democratic political institutions. At the left end of the horizontal axis is social integration, the value which expresses the fact that civil society is capable of reproducing and integrating itself as a society, but also illustrates the fact that civil society is integrated within the framework of a single political system. Silhouetted against this figure it is possible to detect two of the key value dimensions of liberal democracy: human freedom and security – see Figure 2.

Figure 2: Values of modern democracy

The vertical axis represents the values of human individuality, freedom, and particular interests. In the social sciences these issues tend usually to be the subject of research focusing on agency (the agency approach). The horizontal axis represents the value dimensions of social cohesion and shared norms: i.e. values of safety, security, and shared outlooks in action. In the social sciences this level of research tends to be the subject of macro-theoretical analyses focusing on society as a whole and on its structural nature and aspects. The social sciences usually refer to this analysis as the structural or the structural-functional approach. It may perhaps be said that in the figure the vertical axis represents the more liberal values, while the horizontal axis represents rather republican values and convictions.

The level of utopianism that is present in Figure 1 is reduced and a dose of scepticism or realism is added to the configuration to produce the image in Figure 3. This figure represents a configuration of the serious risks and causes that are connected to the failure of the process of democratic political decision-making and which can occur in the relationships between civil society and the democratic state (government) and seriously threaten their cohesion and reciprocal dynamics. This refers to (1) the loss of legitimacy of political institutions, (2) a decline in political participation, (3) uncontrolled growth of state surveillance, and finally (4) the threat of social atomisation or even anomy.

Figure 3: The risks in modern democracy

There are certainly numerous connections that exist between these risks as well as numerous ties and repercussions among the four functional dimensions discussed above. It is not always possible to determine without question which risks represent the causes and which the effects of a breakdown in the functional dimensions in the relationship between civil society and the state. It is, however, certain that all of the risks can pose a serious threat to the security and stability of democracy and represent a threat to the level of freedom that has been achieved in the West. The concept of civil society is not motivated by anything less than the effort to seek the guarantees of democratic development and emancipatory opportunities. The proposed configuration of this entire issue represents an attempt to grasp the relationship between civil society and the democratic state (government) in all its complexity.

Towards A European Civil Society

Silhouetted against Figure 1 and 3 it is possible to structure the concept of European civil society: Four dimensions of civil society on a European level correspond to the following notions: (1) European public sphere, (2) multilevel (polycentric) governance, (3) multilevel civil society, and (4) European identity. Each of these represents a vast research field which encompasses a cluster of problems and questions. However, the following diagram, Figure 4, suggests a conceptual interpretative framework for both a theoretical and empirical analysis of the dynamics and mutual relations between the above mentioned four dimensions.

As Giddens (1990: 156) argues, a sign of modernity is that self-realisation becomes a fundamental factor in the formation of (individual) identity. In other words, there are direct links between civic participation and identity formation processes. A decline in civic participation can thus ultimately lead to a serious erosion of social cohesion. Moreover, the lack of civic participation within a given institutional framework presents a crucial obstacle for building ties of loyalty and solidarity with and within this institutional framework. We can, therefore, arguably presume that a deficit of European demos (identity) can be overcome through building a European public sphere and citizenship. It is also undoubtedly true that a weak civil society does not allow a transparent and accountable political power to exercise itself. Therefore, many argue that the lack of a European public (demos) hinders the development of legitimate democratic political power on a European level (Pérez-Díaz 1998). Building a European framework of democratic governance, developing a European public sphere and encouraging European identity (demos) formation are intrinsically connected processes, as suggested in Figure 4. The European civil society concept also suggests that the democratic deficit of the EU has both institutional and socio-cultural aspects which affect each other in a reflexive dynamic relation on both a structural and an agency level.

Figure 4: Dimensions of European civil society

Towards A European Identity – A Chance for Positive Identities

Let me outline some conceptual and empirical parameters of identity forming processes together with the public sphere in relation to Europeanization. Let us start with the notion of identity. First of all, the distinction between ‘collective’ and ‘individual’ identity is analytically and theoretically misleading and biased. Such distinctions are trapped by the vicious circle of methodological nationalism. Every identity is subjective (or inflicted) identity. As the analyses of modern nationalism have shown, national identities are to some great extent defined as negative identities and it has been repeatedly argued that the opportunity for the state to directly intervene into identity forming processes is more possible when the individual suffers identity crises (Hoover 1997). Erik Erikson (the guru of developmental psychology) lifelong research findings show that human nature consists in striving for an identity based on two elements. The first is competence in productive, social, and personal relations. That is why, when asked who we are, most of us answer in terms of what we do - our vocations, roles and status attached to them. The second identity element rests on a sense of integrity within a sensible world of meaning. The inability to assert our competence, to be an integral part of a community, and to build the bonds of mutuality, causes the identity crises. Identity crises might lead - striving for functional "psychosocial equilibrium" (Erikson) - to stereotypical identity formation, foreclosure and pseudo speciation, which, as Marcia (1997) suggests, makes individuals more gullible and mouldable by demagogic political agitation, and more susceptible to dependency on authoritarian leaders.

Hoover (1997) convincingly suggests that a source of legitimacy of any political authority should be sought by reducing the pathological elements in identity formation processes. The main objective of any government should comprise not in bribing its citizens by material benefits, but in creating a suitable environment for individual development and enable an open and reflexive positive identity formation, based on competence, social integrity and mutuality. Positive identities usually lead to mutual recognition, to attenuation of inter-group conflicts, to reinforcement of a sense of belonging, and to self/gratification (Hoover 1997: 66). The EU’s need for an active search for legitimacy could prove, after all, to be an advantage of the EU over national governments, which tend to rely on static social segments and nested collective identities (Eriksen, Fossum 2000).

I suggest that European identity should be primarily seen as a complex of multiple positive identities, as a new enlightenment project, indeed, which encapsulates an attempt to overcome the biasness of national identities and national consciousness. Erikson’s theory shows that the process of socialization and the process of developing our own competence and integrity will inevitably encompass the identity crises, which sooner or later confronts everyone. In regard to the complex and reflexive dynamics of identity concept, no one possesses a single, entire and utterly harmonic identity. Europe is and will be an environment dealing with identity crises, which will be accompanied by the threats of potential pathologies found in identity formation. The EU policies and politics should strive to maintain and foster an environment which allows the reflexive and open identity formation. They should foster a means of reducing pathological tendencies in identity formation processes.

European civil society could be defined as a niche providing those very sources, and creating chances for an open and reflexive identity formation based on competence, social integrity and mutuality. Such a situation could provide a method for creating European identity, which I suggest to perceive – with respect to an individual agency and a prescriptive (and dynamic) dimension of identity (aspirations) - rather than a singular collective identity, as a (strive for) complementarities of multiple positive identities. Such conditions could work towards the de/re/construction of collective identities in Europe; and could work towards building the European identity in a stronger sense. We know that positive identities are most likely to work towards complementary identities, and negative identity towards discrimination between identities. In closing let us briefly focus on an emerging European public sphere vis-à-vis what has been suggested on account of European identity formation.

Towards Spheres of European Publics - Identity as Communication

The widespread Habermasian concept of public sphere has been criticised for having shortcomings, but mainly for its singular perspective as well as for the robust normative overtones. Everyone would agree that a multiplicity of competitive public spheres is the intrinsic essence of liberal democracy. Therefore, a European public sphere can only be envisaged as a multiple sphere of (more or less contentious or competitive) European publics. Nevertheless, an overarching European public sphere which would work parallel to institutional mechanisms of political will formation is needed in order to expose the central EU’s institutions to a legitimate and critical publicity.

The notion of public sphere has always been a rather normative than empirical concept and it is part and parcel of the very essence of the democratic theory. In my view, it is not sufficient to just analyse the scope and changes of transnational communication. We need the concept of European public sphere in order to understand the chances of democratic governance to survive in the era of globalized modernity, and in order to interpret the possibilities for further democratization of the EU and the emancipatory opportunities of Europeans themselves. Nevertheless, empirical research is much needed, in order to reflect on empirical consequences and current limits of our democratic capacities, and being able to formulate practical provisions and measures to challenge them. There is an amazing proliferation of such research agendas (not least due to CINEFOGO network members), which help to analyse challenges and shifts in European ‘real’ civil societies as a major pre/condition for and of European civil society building processes. There is a wide range of intensively discussed issues and obstacles as ‘media national embeddedness’, ‘masmedia commercialization’ and ‘the crisis of legitimate and critical publicity’, ‘a deep information deficit among the EU’s citizens’, or ‘lack of transparency and excessive technocratic practises in the EU’s institutional structure’ etc.

Going back to the concept of European demos, the concept of European identity is, in my opinion, absolutely crucial for the understanding of the European public sphere. I agree with Outhwaite (1999) who suggests that European identity cannot be conceived in traditional conventional terms, like national identities. The main characteristics of European identity cannot be a definition of "borders" by creating the dichotomy of "we" and "others". Had European cultural specificity consisted of cultural diversity then European identity necessarily remains (in a certain sense) unclear and fuzzy. Outhwaite calls conventional national identity atavistic identity, post-national identity must be a post-conventional identity.

In what sense identities could be comprehended as post-conventional? To build complementary, multiple and positive identities is feasible and imaginable only through specific methods of civic and multicultural (or transnational [?]) communication. Giddens suggests (1990) that in the condition of radicalised modernity civic engagement, participation and communication, which are recognized as fair and open, create a crucial precondition for strengthening and establishing bonds of belonging and solidarity, hence positive identities. The concept of European identity as specific means and rules of communication, dialogue and participation presumes a (non-conventional) procedure-like (procedural) concept of identity with a dominance of civic elements in (collective) identity formation, hence an emphasis on the value of rules in the process of communication. As Outhwaite (1999) puts it, the procedures of not reaching consensus are as important (if not more important) as the procedures of reaching consensus, as a decisive precondition to form a collective identity in any stronger sense. In other words, the characters of the political processes and the processes within civil society, which are recognised by their participants as fair and open, matters more, in some sense, than the particular outcomes of these processes. Here, the EU’s constitutional process is the good example which shows elements of an emerging European public sphere; even if a consensus has not been reached, there is the widespread consensus regarding ongoing negotiations. Discussions on tackling the EU’s democratic deficit across Europe, by the way, help to galvanize the elements of an emerging European public sphere.

More than common values, communication itself is creating important sources for the formation of bonds of belonging and of solidarity. As a parallel to political processes we can see a deeper transformation of social relations and societal systems in the social realm, where people’s actions are being ‘lifted out’ from local contexts and their restructuring across indefinite spans of time-space (Giddens 1990). Since the radicalised modernity is featured by a complex reorganisation of time-space relations (Rifkin 2004), it is more accurate to comprehend society as an open system of communication, rather than as an integrated social system of shared meanings and morals embedded in a local context. Societies are nowadays, primarily, communicating societies, networks of mobility, and flows and social communication (Castells 2001, Delanty 2003). Therefore identity, including a European one, should be understood as a project, whose main objective is the active participation in the process of fair and open communication. Communication itself could be (and should be) the main overarching defining characteristic of European identities. European identity ought to be perceived as “routes” rather than “roots”, as involvements in participative processes within spheres of European publics.

Some Conclusions

I have submitted an account of European civil society and the democratic deficit of the EU from the perspective of complementary theory of civil society. I believe that such a macro theoretical and analytical interpretative framework of Europeanization (and an emerging European civil society) allows us to approach the discussed issues with respect to both complexity (and reflexivity) of the social realm, and empirical behavioural aspects of social actors. Four dimensions of European civil society were outlined: European public sphere, multilevel governance, multilevel civil societies and European identity. Such approach enables us to analyse the current democratic deficits of the EU as well as the real (and potential) limits or risks to democratic governance in the EU in the context of the critical political theory, and with respect to both normative and empirical aspects of the problem. The presented complementary theory shows that democratic deficits (plural is perhaps more appropriate) of the EU have both institutional and socio cultural (and symbolic) aspects which should be surveyed on both a structural and an agency analytical level, and in mutual relations and reflexivity. The ambition of the presented approach is also to formulate a justifiable framework for practical action and institutional provisions, both in the public sphere and in the sphere of political power.
Finally, some characteristics of European identity with respect to psychological findings on identity formation are outlined: the case is made for European identity as a project of multiple (and complementary) positive identities. However, such European identity formation can be pursued through a specific method of communication as a cornerstone of European identity. Some outcomes for European public sphere development are then discussed within the framework of the presumed links between public sphere and identity formation processes within the process of Europeanization. The suggestion is made to conceptualize the European public sphere as a multiplicity of competitive European publics, together with a need to build and foster the overarching European public sphere, parallel to the decision making capacities of the EU’s central institutions.

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